Moral Progress

Richard Rorty:

For Mill, James, Dewey, Habermas, and the other philosophers of social democracy, the answer to the question “are some human desires bad?” is: No, but some desires do get in the way of our project of maximizing the overall satisfaction of desire. For example, my desire that my children should have more to eat than my neighbour’s children is not intrinsically evil. But this desire should not be fulfilled. There is no such thing as intrinsically evil desire. There are only desires that must be subordinated to other desires in the interests of fairness. For those who adopt the utiliatarian ideal of maximizing happiness, moral progress consists in enlarging the range of those whose desires are taken into account. It is a matter of what the contemporary American [sic] philosopher Peter Singer called “enlarging the circle of the ‘we’,” enlarging the number of people whom we think of as “one of us”. The most salient example of this enlargement is the change that took place when the rich began to think of the poor as fellow citizens rather than as people whose station in life has been ordained by God. The rich had to stop thinking that the least advantaged children were somehow meant to lead less happy lives than those of their own children. Only then could they start thinking about wealth and poverty as mutable social institutions rather than as parts of an immutable order. Another obvious example of enlarging the circle of the “we” is the recent partial but encouraging success of feminism. The males have recently been more willing to put themselves in the shows of the females. Still another example is the greater willingness of heterosexuals to put themselves in the shoes of homosexuals, to imagine what it must be like to be told that the love they feel for another person is a disgusting perversion.

The ever quotable Rorty. The issue here though is the figure in the middle, Peter Singer. Morality or ethics needs a strong narrative, and there is one, a liberal, utilitarian and rules based ethics, whose figures and fundamental precepts aren’t widely understood. The main people who help construct this narrative are Peter Singer, Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen, Richard Rorty, Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls. More traditionally there is Isaiah Berlin and the pillars of John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant. These are people who ‘define the circle’ and the liberal values which comprise it. There are others of comparably strong importance like Simone de Beauvoir and Edward Said who do what they can to extend the circle, an intrinsically political act which, sadly, seems to require a lot of activism and not simply a lot of thought and reasoning.

The Expending Circle is Peter Singer’s main book arguing that moral progress has occurred and shall continue to occur. He makes this argument on three points, that humans have an affection for kin or people similar to them, that people appreciate mutually advantageous altruism and that people are reasonable (think those points are sufficiently precise, I’m getting a bit tired though…). I think education and technology are two valuable institutions to point out. Language as well. But these are really the vehicles for moral progress, and the drivers to seem to me to be the three points Singer articulates.

 

So, if we assume those statements are valid, the three points making human beings bound to progress morally, then how? And, importantly, how quickly (quickly enough, that’s a pretty darn important question)? Singer believes reasonable or rational discourses will slowly edge outwards and steadily become more inclusive. He thinks that while if you were to map it moral progress would look like a stock market it is nonetheless certainly happening. As he points out, Greek cities used to be in conflict with one another and effectively disputed being the same species as one another. Now all the Greeks are in Greece and Greece itself is apart of the European Union (at least, for now…).

The endgame for this is that we will all become cosmopolitans, or we will all respect everyone of each nationality with no belief that our people should dominate others. But will people stop seeking domination? The Chinese over the Taiwanese? The Turks over the Kurds? Israelis over the Palestinians? Europeans over the Romani? Every society over their immigrant minorities? I hope Singer is right, but I’m unsure. Also there is the question of time. What if a World War breaks out, aren’t we doomed? It is conceivable our moral couldn’t progress quickly enough. When you consider moral progress occurs in history by fallible human beings, molded by ultimately contingent historical forces there is no necessary reason, as far as I can see, that our moral progress necessarily outpaces disaster.

 

I think Singer is right, we’ve got the ingredients for moral progress on us all the time, and we have made extraordinary gains. Furthermore it doesn’t seem clear that there is anything certainly and indubitably preventing us from marching onwards with moral progress. Now I think its up to us to do the legwork and ensure ‘the circle of the ‘we” keeps expanding.

 

 

What’s in the Pacific?

Robert D Kaplan (who I always get mixed up with Robert Kagan) thinks the South China Sea and it’s region at large will be ‘the 21st century’s defining battleground’ and ‘the world’s new center of naval activity’. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton similarly believes ‘the future of politics will be decided in Asia’ and:

One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment — diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise — in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans — the Pacific and the Indian — that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the world’s population. It includes many of the key engines of the global economy, as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia.

Ok, so the Pacific is important, what’s the problem? The problem is China and America. Kaplan hauntingly compares Europe’s war-torn landmass over the 20th century with the future of the waters of the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century. Huge White says ‘how likely is a US-China clash? Hard to say, of course, but I would give an intuitive estimate of between 5 percent and 10 percent over the next decade. If that seems too gloomy, bear in mind that preparing for a war with one another is now clearly the primary strategic priority for both countries’. Further:

 For it isn’t just China that is dramatically building its military; Southeast Asian countries are as well. Their defense budgets have increased by about a third in the past decade, even as European defense budgets have declined. Arms imports to Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia have gone up 84 percent, 146 percent, and 722 percent, respectively, since 2000. The spending is on naval and air platforms: surface warships, submarines with advanced missile systems, and long-range fighter jets. Vietnam recently spent $2 billion on six state-of-the-art Kilo-class Russian submarines and $1 billion on Russian fighter jets. Malaysia just opened a submarine base on Borneo. While the United States has been distracted by land wars in the greater Middle East, military power has been quietly shifting from Europe to Asia.

There is literal fuel for conflict with:

the oil transported through the Strait of Malacca from the Indian Ocean, en route to East Asia through the South China Sea, is more than six times the amount that passes through the Suez Canal and 17 times the amount that transits the Panama Canal. Roughly two-thirds of South Korea’s energy supplies, nearly 60 percent of Japan’s and Taiwan’s energy supplies, and about 80 percent of China’s crude-oil imports come through the South China Sea. What’s more, the South China Sea has proven oil reserves of 7 billion barrels and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, a potentially huge bounty.

Enough of the block quotes (though I believe they are all money quotes, and there is tonnes of arising content important to this topic). What I see (and what Kaplan alludes to, though doesn’t expound fully) is China forming it’s own Monroe Doctrine, attempting to kick competitors out of ‘it’s’ place. The Monroe Doctrine, by the way, wasn’t properly hemispheric (when the US tried to get Europe out of the Western Hemisphere in the 19th century), and Beijing’s aspirations would be even more circumspect relative to the Eastern Hemisphere. But it should be noted that China is wooing much of Africa through trade (with ‘no political strings’, i.e. no questions about governance or human rights) and has some sturdy ties with Pakistan (strategically very well located for China). I believe China wants to follow the American model of superpower emergence of regional dominance and getting states in the region to go along, whilst getting the rest of the world to not put up a fight about it having it’s own way. The precise regional area China wants to dominate, to have supremacy over is undefined and uncertain, but China clearly wants a large sphere of influence, significantly larger than it has now. The problem with this is it pisses off just about everyone. In the epicentre of the South China Sea it pisses off the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam (all who will pretty immediately back the United States in a scuffle). This is exacerbated by the East China Sea, where South Korea, Japan and Taiwan effectively lock China out of the Pacific Ocean strategically.

So, the matters are China is trying to gain more regional influence and supremacy by shoving it’s way into the South China Sea, which hopefully means Taiwan is on the back-burner and no conflict is foreseeable, although it could mean that once China knows it can assert itself  it will go after Taiwan. Taiwan, it is important to underline, is the small, plucky neighbour which serves as a good bulwark against China, but because of it’s size could be put under extreme duress if China got serious. Taiwan, also, at least seen 1949 has been the target of many of a Chinese Communist’s hatred. While probably first being fueled by concerns to conquer the nationalists who were chased out of China to Taiwan there is also clearly a sense of righting the wrongs done by colonial expansion with China growing large and asserting itself (like it would through ‘reunification’ with Taiwan), exorcising the humiliating colonial carve up of the 19th and early twentieth centuries is clearly important as well. Undoubtedly many of the older and historical heads in the communist party see challenging the US as part of some single ongoing fight against ‘Western imperialists’.

America’s position is steadfast. America is waking up after it’s decade long stupor and the thoughts and policies of the country seem to be reorienting it towards the Asia-Pacific ‘as we move forward to set the stage for engagement in the Asia-Pacific over the next 60 years, we are mindful of the bipartisan legacy that has shaped our engagement for the past 60’ ‘I hear everywhere I go that the world still looks to the United States for leadership. Our military is by far the strongest, and our economy is by far the largest in the world. Our workers are the most productive. Our universities are renowned the world over. So there should be no doubt that America has the capacity to secure and sustain our global leadership in this century as we did in the last’. The problem is as clear as two forces heading directly for a head-on collision. Something’s got to give in this game of chicken. Either the US stops, as Kaplan puts it, with ‘its busybody morality’ and excessively caring about ‘the internal nature of the Chinese regime’ and lets China sets the rules and norms for the regional order (because in Kaplan’s quintessential realist argument ‘the balance of power itself, even more than the democratic values of the West, is often the best safeguard of freedom’) or China becomes a ‘responsible global stakeholder’ and falls into line with the international order of the Liberal Leviathan, the United States.

The effect of giving up values (which are interest as well) is, okay, say you don’t care about the politics of the Chinese regime, but what about the regime in Hong Kong? In Taiwan? In Vietnam? In Thailand? In Indonesia? In Pakistan? In Angola? In South Africa (‘The developing world was told that if it did not Westernize and change its political systems to mirror those of the West, they could forget about achieving economic growth and development. Now we are asking what we could learn from other political systems and cultures. Is the political discipline in China a recipe for economic success, for example?’ Words not from avowed communist, but from South African President Jacob Zuma in 2010. A visa for the Dalai Lama was refused from South Africa in late 2010 as well, which caused Desmond Tutu to say ‘our government is worse than the apartheid government because at least you would expect it with the apartheid government’ and ‘our government we expect to be sensitive to the sentiments of our constitution’ here)? My money is on the need for preserving the liberal international order, and I think the stability obsessives overlook that we can walk and chew gum at the same time. But China would clearly have to repent and not demand South Africa, not demand Angola, Not demand Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam and I hope Taiwan act in specific ways. Trade yes, but truly with ‘no political strings’. The question is whether China is willing to play by the international rules or whether it harbors expectations to set the rules itself, especially non-interference (especially no criticism of human rights and governance, even most probably allowing for genocide) and state sovereignty (having countries emulate it, either due to internal or external motivation, either through sticks or carrots, clearly seems to be in China’s interest and possible intent).

I think the liberal order must be maintained by those who have established and maintained it, and history would veer in a dangerous direction if it were shaken up. The global order that’s been established in the past, roughly, few centuries must be maintained. Instead of the world trying to accommodate to China, China must accommodate and go along with the rest of the world.

The Market to the Rescue?

I have recently began pondering how effectual the market could be in developing countries at spurring growth and alleviating poverty. My belief is the market, especially through international trade, is f**king up the livelihoods of many people needlessly in the developing world (whilst actually being a simultaneous drag on the well-being of those in the developed world).

What is interesting also is what is not happening with the market in relation to the developing world. Something like 1 to 3 percent of global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) goes into Sub-Saharan Africa. If capitalism and traditional or conventional economics held weight, then there should be money pouring in to the country to take advantage of the low labour costs, the lack of competition and the huge population of consumers (around 900 million) who whilst, admittedly, have limited income that doesn’t mean at all there isn’t potential for growth. Hasn’t the world learned anything from South Korea, Thailand, India, Brazil, South Africa (!) and China? Every geographical region in the world has had countries which have yielded huge economic growth (hence profits) over the past one to two decades. Why isn’t money pouring into Africa?

Some say it is because of instability. Yet that isn’t really true for at least half the countries in recent years, and off the top of my head I’d guess a quarter of SSA countries, at least a sturdy dozen, have had meaningful stability for around a decade. Another reason which Paul Collier offers is a lack of information. I think, as is often the case, Collier is on the money. The markets are viewed as too small and information gathering is viewed as too difficult. I think that is just complacent ignorance and opportunity missing. Three decades ago in 1980 in China around 80% of the population lived on a dollar a day. FDI really came several years later, around 1987 and was interrupted to a degree with Tiananmen massacre, but then gathered paced as the 1990s rolled on and has been rocketing since the new millennium. The moral of the story is the rags to riches transformation. Once not only seen as poor but actually being poor, China then transformed into an investment goldmine, a land of potentially endless growth and profits. Moreover, the early bird gets the worm. Those who came first, once they broke into markets and became established, reaped the most benefits. So, whence foreign entrepreneurialism in Africa?

I think a big part of the story is that the markets and the entrepreneurial folk have become complacent and lacking in incentives in recent times. This is due in last part to the changes (mainly deregulation) of the financial industry around the 1980s and is exemplified by the rates of increases in income for the top 1% in developed countries (not at all correlated to economic growth or even the respective performance of firms). Why bother with old school efforts of trying to find business opportunities and use entrepreneurial cunning to make money when electronic computerised trading can earn steady, comfortable profits? Why invest in a country which had nothing said or taught about it in business school (which probably true for the whole region), when you can make easy, comfortable profits on, say, American housing, where the mortgages are sold between one financial goliath after another pleasing all with comfortable profits?

It needn’t be like this. Opportunities needn’t be missed. A theoretical example I have is a franchise of bakeries in small to medium African cities, which have sufficiently reliable electricity and water. Say you invest in getting modern, industrial efficient baking  machinery, which is capital that would give, of course, an unrivaled ability for production and productivity. Land would also be relatively cheap, because overall growth is limited so land isn’t in high demand, and labour would also be cheap. Construction of the building of the bakery, I believe, along with the importing (almost definitely required) of the capital into the country would be the most expensive part of the operation. That is, the fixed costs would be significant. The variable costs, labour, raw materials, utilities like electricity (I think they are variable, because you could lessen retail hours and reduce them) would be interesting, but I believe they would be rather cheap and allowing for profit. Training the labour would be an interesting step, but my belief is that if the capital, that is the machinery, for baking is technologically advanced (read smart, intuitive, simple) enough then training shouldn’t be a problem (especially when the labour is motivated by some nice incomes). Lastly there is the demand angle, which because of the inelastic quality of the good would insure high demand and sales. The main pressure on prices would be whether there is competition with supply (mainly existent from supermarkets, who seem to have in-store bakeries, for instance as seen in South Africa), but this would be simply remedied by setting up in a city without much (maybe any) competition. The pressure on prices from demand would be the small disposable incomes of the people, but I don’t think that is a problem because the goods being sold (bread) are intrinsically cheap and furthermore the market is intrinsically large (everyone needs to eat) so good prices and good sales should be achievable. Lastly there is the social side of this operation to consider. Employment wise local construction benefits would exist for constructing the building, agricultural benefits will stem from production of inputs like wheat, grain and yeast and consumption benefits will appear for people who want the kind of healthy and tasty bread which modern technology can produce (because it would involve local ingredients, like wheats and grains, the bread presumably would be palatable and desired). Economic growth would be spurred. I assume given these social benefits the business would decrease poverty to some degree. The only concern would be disenfranchising local bakers (if there are any), which could perhaps be remedied by simply employing them.

 

I believe the world is full of opportunities. As the incredible growth of emerging economies (a term clearly coined to indicate to the business folk that these are the actually developing ‘developing economies’) shows, there are opportunities all over, and a long way to go before they are all discovered and utilised fully. Lastly I sincerely believe there are many gains to be had for all from much that the market does. I also acknowledge that the market is ridden with failures and therefore probably is structured to undermine a lot of well being. But since the market isn’t going anywhere anytime soon it seems vital to me to accentuate it’s strengths and limit and compensate for its weaknesses, and I think we’ll head in the right direction.

Do Rock the Boat

It is rather remarkable when people who are objectively intelligent, such as professors of politics, suppose that chaos, often in the sense of complete societal overthrow, could result from seemingly benign events, like non-violent street protests or demonstrations. The few dozen non-violent protest movements since 1989 have near universally only overthrown the leadership and maybe the political system which kept the leaders in place (which needed overthrowing non-violently to install a non-violent new system, democracy, replacing a violent old one) and have not resulted in some kind of Mad Max post-apocalyptic transformation. Everyone, of course, has their thresholds over what they judge to be ‘destabilising’ in the sense of needlessly chaotic activity. But the fact is reality is full of changes, and even big changes really aren’t ‘the sky is falling’ chaotic,which is the implication a lot of the time (especially since 1989, it looks like no sky shall come down, at least, not due to the kind of upheavals that have presented themselves thus far).

Why is chaos pronounced by people? It is because people like to believe in the illusion of continuity, they like to believe that things are the same (probably the same impulse that longs for immortality and the avoidance of death). Yet this impulse for keeping things the same can ignore necessary change, even necessary destruction. People don’t like letting go, and social movements are the communal act of letting go and moving on.

Huge amounts of people are in poverty globally, around a billion under a dollar and roughly 2.7 billion live on less then two dollars a day, whilst affluent countries have thousands and thousands who are homeless, unemployed, sick, victims of violence and large swathes who have tiny incomes compared to others. Changes need to happen. There won’t (there can’t) be certainty regarding what will follow some of the big changes trying to redress the world (like with revolutions, people seem to think nowadays it should be understood rather precisely what will happen after a revolution! That is beyond broad understandings like democracy, civil war, authoritarianism etc., which are still themselves not estimated with large certainty. A revolution has always been something which has opened up the future, not something which has immediately and clearly locked it into one track). Change must be accepted to fight the ills of the world and if you stand without fear it is rather obvious which movements are trying to better the world and which are trying to destroy it and sow chaos. Change will happen regardless, and you are fooling yourself if you are trying to believe things have stayed the same.

 

This world-order did none of gods or men make, but it always was and is and shall be: an everliving fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures.

– Heraclitus